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omy in the oil rich Middle East, and because its political system is
highly factionalized. The distortions from the factionalized political
system are threefold. First, resources are wasted in the competition
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1 Introduction
The literature on the phenomenon known as the “resource curse” shows that
countries rich in natural resources tend to have a slower economic growth
than countries with a smaller endowment of natural resources (see, for in-
stance, Sachs and Warner, 2001). The negative eﬀect of natural resources
on economic growth is particularly strong in countries with weak institutions
(see Mehlum, Moene and Torvik, 2006a and b). Moreover, natural resources
may negatively aﬀect institutional quality (see Bulte et al, 2005). The curse
also appears to be more severe for point source resources like oil than for
more dispersed natural resources like farmland (see Busby et al, 2003).
When oil revenues are controlled by states with a limited degree of auton-
omy and property rights protection is weak, the result is often a destructive
competition between interest groups to obtain a share of the country’s rents.
This is shown by Hodler (2006), who develops a theoretical model of rent-
seeking and property rights protection, and finds empirical support for the
prediction that resource wealth harms growth in fractionalized countries.
To illustrate the logic of rent-seeking, we have chosen to focus on Iran.
Iran is interesting in this context firstly because it is a rentier economy in
the oil rich Middle East, and secondly because its political system is highly
factionalized. Oil revenues in Iran represent about 60 percent of government
revenues and 34 percent of GDP. More than 80 percent of the country’s
foreign exchange earnings are due to oil exports.1 Politically, Iran is char-
acterized by elite rivalry and fragmentation. From the outset, there were
internal disagreements among the followers of Khomeini, the founder of the
Islamic republic, and such internal conflicts have only grown with time. The
institutional set-up of the republic — which juxtaposes diﬀerent sources of
authority and creates multiple power centers — has made political infight-
ing endemic. Whereas the Shah was the undisputed leader of the Pahlavi
monarchy, and was able to implement growth oriented economic policies, the
autonomy of the Islamic Republic has been lost in power struggles.2
The factional political system has created room for discretion and arbi-
trariness in the design and implementation of rules and regulations. This
lack of state autonomy has stimulated rent-seeking, favoring well connected
public and quasi-public enterprises and hindering private investment. In-
1Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Annual Review, 1380 (2001/2002),
Tehran, 2003.
2See Alizadeh (2000).
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deed, there is a “mismatch” between investment rates and growth rates in
Iran. While investment rates (and in particular public investment rates) on
average have been relatively high in Iran, growth rates in GDP have been
less impressive.
To illustrate this, compare the economic development of Iran andMalaysia
from 1979 to 2003. In 1979, GDP per capita in purchasing parity terms stood
at 3777 USD in Iran, more than 50% higher than that of Malaysia, namely
2457 USD.3 During the 25 years up to 2003, the average yearly investment
rate, as a share of GDP per capita, was 30% in Iran and 25% in Malaysia.
Yet, the yearly average growth rate in GDP per capita was less than 0.1%
in Iran and more than 4% in Malaysia. By 2003, Malaysia’s GDP per capita
had reached 13318 USD, almost twice that of Iran’s at 7206 USD. Figure
1 shows the development in GDP per capita in USD for the two countries
between 1979 and 2003.4
Distortions in the allocation of capital caused by rent-seeking is one possi-
ble explanation for the low returns to investment in Iran. State banks control
almost the entire market for saving and investment in the country. Recent
deregulation has opened up for the entry of private banks, but these are small
and heavily regulated by the government. Interest rates are set politically,
and have generally been below the inflation rate for the last two decades,
hence a negative real interest rate. A large share of credit is allocated to
state-owned enterprises and politically influential institutions such as the re-
ligious foundations, the bonyads.5 In a report on the Iranian economy, the
World Bank states that: “State-owned banks are notoriously liable to make
bad loans, partly because it is very diﬃcult for their managers to resist polit-
ical pressures to lend at low interest rates to politically influential borrowers.
It can also happen as a result of outright corruption, when managers accept
bribes or other favors to make loans that are excessively risky or that they
know will never be repaid.” (World Bank, 2003, page 140).
Another indication of the distortions created by government intervention
and rent distribution is energy ineﬃciency in the Iranian industry. According
to the World Bank (2003, page ix), cement plants in Iran use 35% more
energy than those in Japan and iron mills use 58% more. Large subsidies
3The data underlying the comparison between Iran and Malyasia are from the Penn
World Table, see Heston, Summers and Aten (2006).
4See also Jalali-Naini (2005) and Esfahani (2002) for an overview over economic growth
in Iran.
5More on the bonyads later in the paper, see Section 3.1.
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Figure 1: Economic development in Iran and Malaysia (1979-2003)
on domestic energy use is a prime candidate in explaining the high energy
intensity in production: Oil sold on the domestic market is priced far below
the world market price, with the implicit subsidy amounting to 10 percent
of GDP, among the highest in the world. While such subsidies may be good
politics, in terms of supporting key players in the political economy and
appeasing the general public, they are bad policies from the viewpoint of
eﬃciency and equity. In fact, the World Bank (2003) has estimated that
Iran could eliminate poverty by a more eﬃcient use of its energy wealth.
Standard models of rent-seeking predict that rent dissipation is maxi-
mized when groups have equal rent-seeking eﬃciency.6 One implication from
these models is that increased dominance of one interest group would im-
prove economic eﬃciency by reducing the amount of resources wasted on
rent-seeking. We develop a model demonstrating that this is not necessarily
the case. In fact, for a country like Iran, increased dominance by one group
6See for instance Kohli and Singh (1999), and for an overview over rent-seeking models,
Nitzan (1994).
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may well lead to lower economic eﬃciency, contrary to the standard result
of the rent-seeking literature. The reason for this result is that with asym-
metries in political power, the allocation of capital is skewed in the favor
of the more influential group. When capital (and other factors of produc-
tion, like energy) is heavily subsidized, which is the case in Iran, the low
eﬃciency of investment leads to large costs to society. The costs associ-
ated with increased distortions in the production process may thus dominate
the reduction in costs related to rent-seeking following a larger imbalance in
rent-seeking eﬃciency.
Income is created not only from natural sources like oil and gas, which
can be seen as exogenous to the economy, but also from production decisions
by economic agents in markets characterized by imperfect competition, re-
sponding to inter alia the institutional environment. We refer to the latter
as “regulatory rents” or “man-made rents”. When private property rights
over income are not well defined and/or not well enforced, a common pool
problem arises: Firms realize that a share of the income generated from their
investments will be taxed away by bureaucratic intervention or “mafia-style”
extortion, and the less influential firms respond by investing less. The dis-
tortions from the factionalized political system are therefore threefold. First,
resources are wasted in the competition for rents. Second, the lack of property
rights protection results in less (private) investment at the aggregate level.
Third, imbalances in the distribution of political power between groups lead
to a distortion in the allocation of capital between investors, depressing the
average returns to investment. Resource rents in this model enter as subsi-
dies to the factors of production, thus, everything else equal, increasing the
profits in the economy.
Our model demonstrates that the qualitative eﬀect of changes in the rela-
tive political influence between groups on overall economic eﬃciency depends
on the level of subsidies on factors of production like credit and energy. With
substantial subsidies, as in Iran today, a bias in the allocation of capital be-
tween the groups is the dominating source of ineﬃciency in the economy, and
aggregate welfare is at its highest when groups are equally strong. When sub-
sidies are relatively less important, rent-seeking is the most serious source of
ineﬃciency, and a more imbalanced distribution of political power between
the groups is likely to improve aggregate welfare.
The theme of our formal model is related to Tornell and Lane (1999),
who analyze the “voracity eﬀect”. This eﬀect refers to the possibility that
a windfall gain, such as increased oil revenues, may lead to intensified rent-
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seeking, a more than proportional increase in fiscal redistribution, and lower
growth. Our paper is also related to Baland and Francois (2000) and Torvik
(2002), who analyze how an increase in income from a natural resource may
lead to a reallocation of human capital from productive entrepreneurship
to rent-seeking. They demonstrate that, due to economies of scale in the
productive sector, the external inflow of resources may actually lead to a lower
income for the economy as a whole. The model presented here diﬀers from
these contributions primarily in that it focuses on the distribution of political
strength between interest groups, and moreover, to capture an key feature
of the Iranian economy, analyze rent-distribution from the government the
private sector in the form of subsidies on factors of production.
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a theoretical model
of how the distribution of political influence and economic privileges between
interest groups aﬀect the intensity of rent-seeking. Section 3 studies rent-
seeking in Iran, giving a background for the political factions in Iran and
their relative strengths. This chapter also describes two cases where factional
infighting between interest groups has led to wasteful outcomes. Section 4
concludes.
2 The model
Consider a country with two interest groups, a and b. The two groups have
commercial interests, their actions being guided by an ambition to maxi-
mize profits. In this way, we can think of the groups as firms, and we will
sometimes refer to them as such. The two groups make two sequential deci-
sions. First, they make an investment decision. Second, they determine their
amount of rent-seeking. An investment gives rise to income. Through vari-
ous types of interventions, such as formal taxation and subsidies, and more
informal redistributive activities like extortion and pressure for patronage
employment, the income created is redistributed between the firms. Prop-
erty rights over income from investment are thus not well defined. Indeed,
each firm can be seen as contributing to a common pool of income. The tax-
ation of income, in its various forms, reduces the profitability of investment.
Economic ineﬃciency is aggravated by the fact that the firms use resources
trying to influence the formal and informal taxes and subsidies in order to
grab a larger share of the common pool of income.
The political economy modelled here captures central features of the
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Iranian reality. In the words of Esfahani (2002, page 28-29): “Even private
enterprises that belong to some elite factions may not be immune to rent ex-
traction by rival factions. (. . .) The result has been substantial deterrence
of private investment, except for projects controlled by entrepreneurs who
had firm connections to the stronger factions of the ruling elite. This has
meant a significant shortage of badly needed investments and has served as
an impetus for the expansion of enterprises owned by the government or the
bonyads.”
Using the logic of backward induction, we start by describing the rent-
seeking contest. Let R (k) denote the size of the rent in the economy, deter-
mined by the total level of investment in the economy, k = ka + kb, to be
endogenized later. Let qi be the rent-seeking eﬀort by group i and ρi be i’s
share of the total rent-seeking eﬀort:
ρi =
qi
qa + qb
. (1)
Let αi represent group i’s “influence technology”, which we can think
of as the quality of this group’s political connections. The total influence
available is normalized to unity; αa+αb = 1. The objective function guiding
the rent-seeking eﬀort of firm i ∈ (a, b) is given by:
vi = αiρiR (k)− qi. (2)
The first term here is group i’s income from the rent, its share of the rent
being given by the product of its eﬀort and quality of political connections.
The second terms is the rent-seeking cost, the shadow price of rent-seeking
eﬀorts being normalized to unity. Maximizing vi with respect to i, we get
the first order condition:
αi
qj
(qa + qb)
2R (k)− 1 = 0. (3)
In equilibrium, we find that:
qj
qi
=
αj
αi
. (4)
Using this information in (3), we find the equilibrium rent-seeking eﬀort
of group i as:
qi = α2i (1− αi)R (k) , (5)
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and that total rent-seeking eﬀort as:
qa + qb = αaαbR (k) . (6)
Clearly, total rent-seeking eﬀort is the highest when the political connec-
tions of the two groups are equally strong, i.e., for αa = αb = 0.5. Using (5)
in (2), the equilibrium payoﬀ to firm i at the rent-seeking stage of the game
reduces to:
v∗i = α
3
iR (k) . (7)
We now turn to the investment stage of the game, which determines R (k).
For concreteness, assume the following production function:
Ri (ki) = β ln (1 + ki) , (8)
which has the standard property of a positive, but decreasing, return to
capital. The parameter β captures the level of technology in production. Let
R (k) = Ra (ka) + Rb (kb). The objective of firm i at this stage of the game
is to choose investment so as to maximize profits, given by:
πi = v∗i − rki = α3iR (k)− rki, (9)
where r is the cost per unit of capital facing the firm. We shall open up
for the use of investment subsidies, where the international price of capital
is given by rˆ ≥ r.7 Total subsidies are thus given by:
s = (rˆ − r) (ka + kb) . (10)
Maximizing (9) with respect to ki, using (8), we find that the optimal
investment by group i is given by:
k∗i = max
µ
βα3i − r
r
, 0
¶
. (11)
We observe that group i’s investment increases in the investment tech-
nology parameter β, falls in the cost of capital r and increases in its political
7Other types of subsidies, such as energy subsidies, could also be included. We can
think of a production technology where energy and capital enter in fixed proportions. In
this case, r represents the domestic price per unit of input, and rˆ − r can be interpreted
as the total subidies per unit of input, including both capital and energy subsidies.
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influence, αi. The equilibrium value added of firm i, net of investment costs
and rent-seeking costs, is therefore:
π∗i = α
3
iβ [ln (1 + k
∗
a) + ln (1 + k
∗
b )]− rk∗i . (12)
The total value added, or “welfare”, in the economy, net of subsidies, is
given by
W = π∗a + π
∗
b − s∗, (13)
where s∗ = (rˆ − r) (k∗a + k∗b ). Figure 2 illustrates welfare (W ) as a func-
tion of relative influence (αi) for high (solid, lower curve) and low (dashed,
upper curve) levels of subsidies.8
0.750.6250.50.3750.25
15
12.5
10
7.5
5
2.5
0
Relative influence
W
Relative influence and welfare
We observe that with a low level of subsidies, welfare reaches a minimum
at αi = 0.5, i.e., with equal distribution of political influence. This is because
the aggregate rent-seeking eﬀort at this point reaches its maximum, as can be
8The paramater values used in Figure 2 are: β = 10, r = 0.1, the low level of subsidy
rˆlow = 0.2, and the high level of subsidy rˆhigh = 0.5. Note that with these parameter
values, ki, kj > 0 is true for αi ∈ (0.2154, 0.7846), which also defines the interval of
relative influence on the horizontal axis in Figure 2.
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seen from (6). A more unequal distribution of power would lead to increased
economic eﬃciency by reducing rent-seeking in the economy.
With high levels of subsidies, on the other hand, equal political influence
represents a point of maximum welfare. While rent-seeking is still at its most
intense here, there is another eﬀect that dominates, namely investment ef-
ficiency. The amount of capital per unit of output, (ka + kb) /R (k), which
captures the degree of investment ineﬃciency, is a U-shaped function of αi,
reaching its lowest level for αi = 0.5. Hence, returns per unit of investment
is highest when influence is balanced. The more unbalanced is the distribu-
tion of political power, the less eﬃcient is the country in its use of capital.
Indeed, as illustrated in Figure 2, with a high level of subsidization of capital
(and other complementary inputs like energy), the investment ineﬃciency
can dominate the rent-seeking ineﬃciency.
Oil revenues in the present model stimulate investment by financing subsi-
dies on capital (and energy). While this is likely to stimulate investment, part
of the positive eﬀect on the economy is crowded out by increased rent-seeking.
In addition, with asymmetries in the political influence between groups, part
of the subsides will be used to subsidize lower-productive investment by the
politically more influential group. In this way, the model can shed light on
the mismatch between high investment rates and low growth in Iran, noted
in the introduction to the paper.
The model also predicts that with a more unbalanced distribution of po-
litical influence in a country like Iran, we would expect to see less rent-seeking
but also a more ineﬃcient allocation of capital, in favor of the politically more
influential group. Since the marginal return to investment for this group is
low, and since important inputs like credit and capital are heavily subsidized
in Iran, economic eﬃciency in the country as a whole may well suﬀer from
such a political development.
Given the high level of subsidies in Iran on key factors of production such
as capital and energy, it seems plausible that a political development which
tilts the balance of power in favor of one group, is likely to lower the overall
eﬃciency of the economy. While such a development might well reduce the
intensity of the rent-seeking contest, this eﬀect is likely to be dominated by
increased distortion in the allocation of capital and the associated “waste”
of subsidies on low-return investments. In what now follows, we describe
in more detail the emergence of factions in Iran and analyze their relative
strengths.
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3 Rent-seeking in Iran
3.1 Political factions
The political factions dominating the political and economic life in Iran today
grew out of the 1979 Islamic revolution.9 Control over state institutions and
political decisions is the prerogative of those who supported Khomeini during
the revolution and their aﬃliates. The common ground for these politicians
was their agreement that Iran’s political system should be based on Khome-
ini’s doctrine of velayat-e faqih (government of the jurisconsult). Beyond this
initial agreement, the followers of Khomeini had diﬀering ideological views
and political interests. Though the Islamic Republic curtailed the liberty of
Iranian society and especially its political opponents, the internal culture of
the political elite was suﬃciently free to allow diﬀerent opinions to be played
against each others. Combined with a constitutional framework that counter-
balances mutually independent institutions, this “culture of disagreement”
has led to emergence of four main political factions.
During the 1980s, the conflict line within the Islamic Republic was mostly
bipolar. On the one side, the “radicals” called for a “classless society”, ex-
port of the Islamic revolution and a socially and economically interventionist
state. On the other, the “conservatives” favored private property rights,
“revolution in one country” and traditional Islamic jurisprudence over state-
led remaking of society. While the radicals had the support of the majority
of voters and therefore dominated popular-based institutions like the gov-
ernment and the Parliament, the conservatives had their stronghold in the
Guardian Council. At the end of the decade, the radicals started losing grip
on the government and the contour of a third political faction emerged. Its
gravity center was Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani who was elected president
in 1989. At the time, the faction was called “reformist” as it called for lib-
eralization of Iran’s economic and social policies. With the appearance of
a politically oriented reform movement under Muhammad Khatami’s pres-
idency, however, the Rafsandjani-led technocrat faction was dubbed “prag-
matic conservatives”.
Khatami’s election in 1997 was the breakthrough of what is currently
called the “reformists”. The label was in fact a new name for the old-time
radical faction, which had gone through an ideological transformation and
9For a more complete description of political developments in post-revolutionary Iran,
see Baktiari (1996), Brumberg (2001), and Moslem (2002).
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rethought its political creed. Having beenmarginalized politically in the early
1990s, the once so ardent defenders of velayat-e faqih and draconian state
Islamism had gradually come to embrace a much more liberal approach. The
intellectual criticism of politicized religion formulated by Abdolkarim Soroush
and others had a strong impact on the reformists. In Soroush’ view, the
Islamic Republic had lost its support in the population and tarnished religion
by associating Islam so tightly with the state and forcing it on people.10
The only way the Islamic Republic could survive as a popularly based and
genuinely religious movement, according to the reformists, was to install a
state of law and increase democratic practices. For four years after their
victory in the 2000 parliamentary elections, the reformists controlled both
the government and the parliament in Iran.
The heydays of the reform movement were also a time of reorganization
within the conservative faction. Through confrontations with the reformists,
a “neo-conservative” faction emerged. It consisted to a large degree of young
conservative recruits who had served as the Islamic Republic’s bulwark in
armed units like the Bassij-militia, the Ansar-e Hezbollah and the Revolu-
tionary Guard. Having fought the “enemies of the Islamic Republic” on the
ground, these “foot soldiers” found their influence inside the conservative fac-
tion unequal to their eﬀort. They criticized the “old guard” of leniency and
demanded an ideological return to the “original values” of the Islamic revolu-
tion, meaning strict moral enforcement, social justice and anti-imperialism.
The neo-conservative Abadgaran-list won the majority in Teheran’s munici-
pal elections in 2003 and the national parliamentary elections of 2004. Mah-
mud Ahmadinejad’s victory in the 2005 presidential elections broke the last
reformist stronghold, and put the neo-conservatives in charge of the govern-
ment.
Besides their ideological disagreements, Iran’s political factions also rep-
resent diﬀerent social interests. This is both the case on a grand level and in
terms of small-scale patronage networks. In broad terms, the reformists ap-
peal to intellectuals and students, the pragmatic conservatives voice concerns
of technocrats and businessmen, the conservatives defend the bazaar and the
clergy and the neo-conservatives speak the cause of the socially deprived.
Of more immediate importance for the rent-seeking economy, however, are
the informal networks of the elite groups. Each faction has built up its own
patronage network, through friendships and years in power. With govern-
10See Jahanbakhsh (2001).
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ment control being key to business opportunities, profit-seekers curry favor
with politicians and decision-makers give contracts to “their” entrepreneurs.
Businessmen who are known to have received preferential treatment by one
political faction may not be given equal trust and favors by the next gov-
ernment. Changes on the political level thus usually aﬀect the strength of
economic actors.
The religious foundations (bonyads) represent a clear link between po-
litical and economic interest groups. These foundations, springing out of
the Islamic revolution, have developed into economic conglomerates with ac-
tivities in sectors like finance, tourism, imports/exports and manufacturing.
To promote their “revolutionary” and “altruistic” mission, the bonyads are
exempted from taxes and government control. They also receive direct trans-
fers through the budget. The bonyads are dominating actors in the non-oil
economy. For example, the most prominent of them, the Foundation for
the Oppressed (Bonyad-e Mostazafan), controls some 20% of the country’s
production of textiles, 40% of soft drinks, two-thirds of all glass products
and a dominant share also in tiles, chemicals, tires and foodstuﬀs (see Mal-
oney, 2000 and Behdad, 2000). The bonyads are key players in the political
economic landscape of Iran. In the words of Maloney (2000, page 148): “In
conjuncture with their financial muscle has come political influence; by virtue
of intricate personal and institutional ties with the government, the bonyads
have become pivotal actors in the enduring rivalry among the ideologically
oriented factions within the clerical establishment.”
Due to “checks and balances” in the Iranian political system, a politi-
cal faction rarely obtain a hegemony or completely marginalize the others.
For one, a well-established political practice accept all historic followers of
Khomeini as legitimate political actors and, by extension, as legitimate po-
litical opposition when they lose elections. Second, the institutional set-up of
the 1989 Constitution include non-elected power centers whose oﬃcials are
personally appointed by the Supreme Leader (rahbar-e enqelab). Such insti-
tutions include the Guardian Council, the Expediency Council, the Leader’s
oﬃce, and the Revolutionary Guard, which all play crucial roles within the
system and sometimes wield more power than the government itself. The
heads of the religious foundations are also appointed by the leader.
By making sure that politicians from diﬀerent factions are appointed to
diﬀerent institutions, the Leader undermines challenges to his own predomi-
nant position and especially counterbalances the power of the system’s num-
ber two — the president. While reformists and neo-conservatives controlled
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the government and the parliament in recent years, the conservatives (and to
a certain extent pragmatic conservatives) have dominated non-elected bas-
tions like the Guardian Council and the Expediency Council.
3.2 Rent-seeking in action
There are several channels for rent-seeking in Iran. Not all of these are
related to oil. According to the World Bank (2003), Iran has one of the most
concentrated industry structures in the world. There are also pervasive price
distortions in the economy. Both of these factors create regulatory rents.
The most important channels for distributing oil rents are development
projects and subsidized loans. One way to create rents from development
projects such as dams, roads, and hospitals, is for the bureaucrats running the
project to make a generous estimation of the project’s costs. The diﬀerence
between the oﬃcial cost of the project and the actual cost may then be split
between the contractor and the bureaucrats.
Concerning subsidized loans, these are typically administered by state
development banks to promote investment projects in peripheral regions.
Well-connected entrepreneurs can get access to such loans, and use the money
for completely other purposes than those intended. Thus, subsidized loans
for raising chicken in the remote region of Baluchistan, for instance, may well
end up as property investments in Tehran.
The regulatory rents are a reflection of the extent of state intervention in
the economy. Due to a lack of transparency, taxes can be avoided and regula-
tions bypassed. For instance, in Tehran, the Mayor’s oﬃce has been reported
selling permissions to exceed the legal number of floors in housing projects.
Competition for positions in the Mayor’s oﬃce and similar jobs in the bu-
reaucracy, is fierce. Similarly, firms spend resources to court bureaucrats in
order to obtain privileges and favors.
Another regulatory rent is derived from trade barriers. Tariﬀs create a
wedge between world prices and domestic prices, and thus a premium for
those who can avoid the tariﬀ. Avoiding tariﬀs can be achieved through lob-
bying or through smuggling. Thirdly, there are monopolies in the imports
and distribution of basic consumer goods such as sugar, tea, rice, and to-
bacco. While there is no legal foundation for these monopolies, they are held
by quasi-statal actors, and de facto sanctioned by the state, and can thus
reasonably be considered as regulatory rents.
The negative impacts of rent-seeking on the economy are obvious. Costs
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and prices are higher than necessary, delays are frequent, and quality is often
poor. As way of illustration, consider the following case.
3.2.1 The airport
The construction of a new international airport in Tehran started in the
Pahlavi era and — though temporarily interrupted by the revolution — was
continued by the Islamic Republic. With capacity, noise and pollution prob-
lems in the old Mehrabad airport, the “Imam Khomeini airport”, as the
project was called in 1990, is meant to service international flights. Oﬃ-
cially inaugurated on May 8 2004, in the presence of the President and other
government oﬃcials, the celebration came to an end when divisions from
the Revolutionary Guard interfered. After the first flight had arrived, they
blocked the runway with 30 minibuses, forcing an Iran Air flight from Dubai
to pull up and return. The airplane later landed in Isfahan.11 The airport
has since been closed.
The background for the interference by the Revolutionary Guards was
as follows. A Turkish-led consortium, Tepe-Akfen-Vie (TAV), had won the
tender for running the airport. A company headed by the Revolutionary
Guards had also participated in this tender, but lost. Protesting against the
government’s decision, they claimed that the Turkish presence at the airport
represented a security risk. The real motive behind their reaction, however,
appears to have been diﬀerent. At Mehrabad airport, the Revolutionary
Guards have their own terminal, where smuggled goods can be brought into
the country. With international flights now moving to the new airport, they
demand similar facilities there. The government, being dominated by re-
formists, opposed their demands and chose the Turkish company. This is
when the Revolutionary Guards decided to react.
The Revolutionary Guards is an actor with great economic and political
power in Iran. They form the core of the country’s security system, and
are heavily armed. Economically, they are engaged in various large scale
development projects, like building roads, dams, etc. The weapon industry
is under their control. In addition, they control much of the country’s illegal
trade.
The struggle for control over the airport illustrates in a clear way the
losses from rent-seeking. A large airport has been built and is ready for use.
11See www.iran-press-service.com, May 8, 2004, “Tehran new international airport shut
by the army”.
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But because of a power struggle, it cannot be fully utilized.12
3.2.2 The oil stabilization fund
Another illustration of rent dissipation in Iran is given by the fate of the
so-called Oil Stabilization Fund (OSF). Since the debt crisis in 1993, sta-
bilizing the flow of oil revenues to the economy has been a major policy
concern. Iranian development planners in the second Rafsanjani government
(1993-1997) thought the solution might be establishing a petroleum fond for
investment in international capital markets to protect the economy from fluc-
tuations in the oil price. Due to low oil prices in the second half of the 1990s,
the project did not materialize, but with the rise in oil prices from 1999,
savings picked up. The Third Five-Years Development Plan (2000-2005)
called for the establishment of a “foreign exchange reserve account” (hesab-e
zakhire-ye arzi) to stabilize the government’s budgets. Higher incomes from
crude oil exports than foreseen in the budget were to be deposited at the
Central Bank. Contrary to the original idea, however, the OSF’s invest-
ments were not confined to international markets. In fact, a November 2000
amendment to the plan explicitly stipulated that 50% of the fund’s reserves
should be spent on private investment projects inside the country.
The responsibility of administrating this activity was given to a seven-
member Board of Trustees composed of senior government oﬃcials under the
chairmanship of the head of the Plan and Budget Organization (sazmane bar-
name va budje), later renamed to The Plan and Management Organization
(sazman-e barname va mudiriat). Both the size of the account adminis-
tered by this organization and the guidelines for allocating subsidized credit
to private investment projects are unclear. The OSF is managed outside
the framework of the national budget, and its balance sheet has never been
submitted to the Parliament (Majlis). Hence, the possibilities of abuse are
significant.13
In the elections of February 2004, the reformists lost their majority in the
Majlis. Knowing that their neo-conservative rivals would take over control
over the Parliament by June 2004, they started emptying the remaining fifty
percent of the foreign exchange reserve. It should be noted that the emptying
12According to the Chairman of the State Aviation Organization, Hassan Hajalifard,
about 244 billion toman has been spent on the project, see Iran International Monthly
Magazine no. 29, May 2004, pages 96-99, www.netiran.com
13For a critical review of the Oil Stabilization Fund, see Amuzegar (2005).
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of the oil fund came at a time when the oil prices were historically high. Under
normal circumstances, this should imply an accumulation of funds, not their
depletion.
The neo-conservative 7th Majlis (2004-2008) has continued spending from
the OSF to finance oﬀ-budget items. Following up on Ahmadinejad’s pledge
to “put oil revenues on the people’s table”, the Parliament has used its leg-
islative power to by-pass the fund’s original purpose. Among the beneficiaries
of such extra-budgetary funding were the Bassij militia, war veterans, Imam
Khomeini’s Relief Committee and the police — all traditional supporters of
the conservative factions.
The experience with the OSF illustrates the problem of sheltering oil
revenues from populist pressures and political infighting. Eager to promote
their own interests and opposing those of rival groups, the diﬀerent factions
have strong incentives to spend the oil revenues. The OSF was initially
established to stabilize the budget if the oil price dropped below $20/barrel.
But with oil pricing comfortably in the range of $50-$60/barrel in 2005-2006,
the Parliament was still authorizing lavish spending. Needless to say, the
eﬀect was not to stabilize the economy.
4 Concluding comments
Countries richly endowed with natural resources often have low growth rates.
This is particularly true for oil rich countries with weak political and legal
institutions. One explanation to this “natural resource curse” is rent-seeking.
The present article has analyzed rent-seeking both from a theoretical angle
and from an applied angle, using Iran as a case. Oil revenues in Iran have
been used to finance major public construction projects like the new airport
in Tehran, to build the Oil Stabilization Fund, and to promote the private
sector through subsidized credit and energy. We have argued that rent-
seeking has reduced the benefit to society of these policies and projects. One
indication of this is that while investment rates in Iran have been high, fuelled
by oil revenues, economic growth has been relatively modest. Our theoretical
model emphasizes that the low returns to investment are likely to be due to
both the direct costs of rent-seeking and the suboptimal allocation of capital
between investors.
The model also shows that while increased dominance by one group is
likely to reduce intensity of the rent-seeking competition, and thereby reduce
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associated economic waste, such a development is likely to increase other
distortions in the economy. In particular, the reallocation of power will lead
to a reallocation of factors of production in favor of the stronger group.
The allocation of scarce resources according to political strength rather than
economic productivity leads to ineﬃciencies. The model shows that when
the factors of production are heavily subsidized, which is the case in Iran,
increased imbalance in the political power may well lead to an eﬃciency loss
for the economy as a whole.
An interesting implication of the model is that in an environment of in-
tense rent seeking, like Iran, institutional reforms that provide greater secu-
rity for firms’ investments may be more productive than policy reforms that
seek to stimulate the income potential of the economy, like capital market
deregulation. Indeed, much of the potential gain from deregulation can be
expected to disappear through intensified destructive competition.
According to the logic of our model, there are two ways of reducing rent-
seeking in the economy. Firstly, by one of the competing groups gaining full
control over the state apparatus. In this case, there will no longer be room for
destructive competition over rents. Such a solution would replicate the situ-
ation in Indonesia under Suharto, where an omnipotent leader monopolized
corruption and generated economic growth. However, the likelihood of such
a scenario in the Iranian case is low. The Islamic Republic has been haunted
by internal power struggles since its creation in 1979. No single leader or
faction seems to have the strength to take complete control. Moreover, as
shown by our model, in the absence of clearly defined and enforced property
rights, such a monopolization of political power will lead to a sharp reduc-
tion in investment by the marginalized groups, thus leading to low returns
on capital in aggregate. Hence, in the long run, at least, such a political
hegemony is not likely to be compatible with economic development.
The second way of removing rent-seeking is by eliminating the power of
rent-seeking groups and establishing an autonomous state. This can take
place through a process of democratization, where greater transparency and
accountability reduce the scope for rent-seeking. An important lesson from
the growth literature is that sound institutions are essential for economic
development. By professionally managing the oil rent and creating oppor-
tunities for all, the destructive competition that has plagued the Iranian
economy for decades can turn constructive.
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